Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises

By María Soledad Martínez Pería, S. Schmukler. 2001

764 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bdf1fbc9024f94b9be5adfb89e411b62690b4acc

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Citations in the corpus

The evolution of a financial crisis: panic in the asset-backed commercial paper market (2009, background): “More generally, the finding that distinctions among key features were amplified after the crisis began is consistent with MartinezPeria and Schmuckler (2001), who find that higher premiums were required for risk characteristics of financial institutions after the onset of troubles.”
Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk-Taking : Evidence from Internal Loan Ratings (2008, neutral): “The effect reverses in the second half: with deposit insurance, banks with worse portfolios are more likely to issue subprime loans, consistent with theoretical predictions (Merton (1977)).”
Who Disciplines Bank Managers? (2009, neutral): “Martinez Peria, M. S., and S. Schmukler, 2001, “Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior?”
Banking stability determinants in Africa (2018, neutral): “The non-performing loans to total loans ratio and the loan loss coverage ratios are two traditional measures of bank credit risk (Martínez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Nier and Baumann, 2006; Ozili and Outa, 2017; Fernández, González and Suárez, 2016; Ozili 2017c).”
Payoff complementarities and financial fragility: Evidence from mutual fund outflows $ (2010, background): “This explanation is reminiscent of the empirical banking-crises literature that argues that withdrawals from banks are largely driven by bad fundamentals (Gorton (1988), Calomiris and Mason (1997), Schumacher (2000), Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001), and Calomiris and Mason (2003)).”
Financial liberalization, prudential supervision, and the onset of banking crises (2004, background): “Furthermore, since supervisors are also unfamiliar with the new ‘rules’, their effectiveness decreases (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993; Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Niel and Baumann, 2002).”
A Tale of Two Runs: Depositor Responses to Bank Solvency Risk (2014, background): “…withdrawals act as a form of depositor discipline on risky banks (Park and Peristiani, 1998; Billett, Garfinkel, and O’Neal, 1998; Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Goldberg and Hudgins, 2002; Bennett, Hwa and Kwast, 2014).4 However, the empirical literature also finds some runs are partly…”