Payoff complementarities and financial fragility: Evidence from mutual fund outflows $

By Qi Chen, Itay Goldstein, Wei Jiang. 2010

555 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4e1545a87fc888b83b156cf9543c48a818414211

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Citations in the corpus

Investor Flows and Fragility in Corporate Bond Funds (2017, background): “First, the 3 Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010) develop a model of runs in the tradition of the global-games literature—e.g., Morris and Shin (1998) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) —and show how complementarities will generate this amplification of outflows following bad performance.”
Where the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk (2017, unknown): “17 Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010) provide evidence of such a strategic complementarity using data on mutual funds.”
Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds (2016, background): “First, we present new evidence of strategic complementarities, consistent with results in recent work by Chen et al. (2010), Qian and Tanyeri (2013), and Hertzberg et al.”
Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation (2014, unknown): “Chen et al. (2010) identify strategic complementarities in mutual fund investment by relying precisely on the fact that illiquid funds (those with a higher fire sales penalty in 24 See also Corsetti et al. (2004, 2006) for other effects of the presence of large players. our model) generate larger…”
Ownership Structure , Limits to Arbitrage and Stock Returns: Evidence from Equity Lending Markets (2016, unknown): “Bakke and Whited (2010), Chen et al. (2010), and Edmans et al. (2012) find that stock prices feed back into management decisions about investment and takeovers, and Goldstein and Guembel (2008) show that a speculator may manipulate prices by short selling with the objective of distorting investment.”
Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? on the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation (2015, unknown): “For an analysis of the macroeconomic consequences of negative shocks to financial intermediation, see Curdia and Woodford (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Hall (2011), Christiano and Ikeda (2011), Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Müller (2011) who all build on the classic contribution of Bernanke, ”
Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises (2014, unknown): “Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010) and Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2011) provide empirical evidence consistent with the existence of strategic complementarities between investors in financial institutions.”
Public Information and Coordination: Evidence from a Credit Registry Expansion (2011, unknown): “…from the expansion of the Public Credit Registry in Ar1Indirect evidence of coordination motives among creditors has been shown by Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) and Brunner and Karhnen (2008), and among investors in mutual funds by Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010). gentina in 1998.”
A Liquidity-Based Theory of Closed-End Funds (2009, background): “These externalities create the potential for a fund-run, analogous to a bank-run (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Chen et al., 2007).”
The role of venture capital in the emerging entrepreneurial finance ecosystem: future threats and opportunities (2019, background): “Because of their open-ended nature and obligation to meet all the redemption orders coming from the funds’ shareholders, mutual funds should be unable to invest in illiquid securities (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang 2010; Chernenko and Sunderan 2016; Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng 2017).”
Redemption risk and cash hoarding by asset managers (2017, methodology): “, 2016; Chen et al., 2010 ). This mechanism has figured prominently in the policy debates (see FSB, 2015 ; and FSB, 2016 ). The second mechanism discussed in the literature is concerned with the interactions across asset managers arising from competition for fund flows. When decision horizons are sh”
Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the US Banking Sector (2017, unknown): “Our model is also in the spirit of the existing literature on bank runs, financial stability, and financial regulation, including the seminal work of Diamond Dybvig (1983), and more recently Postlewaite and Vives (1987); Cooper and Ross (1998); Peck and Shell (2003); Allen and Gale (2004); Rochet an”
Conflicting Family Values in Mutual Fund Families (2013, background): “See, for example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Busse (2001), and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002).”