The neural correlate of (un)awareness: lessons from the vegetative state.
By Steven Laureys. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2005
786 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Consciousness has two main components: wakefulness and awareness. The vegetative state is characterized by wakefulness without awareness. Recent functional neuroimaging results have shown that some parts of the cortex are still functioning in 'vegetative' patients. External stimulation, such as a painful stimulus, still activates 'primary' sensory cortices in these patients but these areas are functionally disconnected from 'higher order' associative areas needed for awareness. Such studies are disentangling the neural correlates of the vegetative state from the minimally conscious state, and have major clinical consequences in addition to empirical importance for the understanding of consciousness.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bddf8b3075f1b70b433e2f074b6f6c1fb79284e7
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Citations in the corpus
- The Neural Basis of the Dynamic Unconscious (2011, background): “…cortices (including parietal areas) in the representation of the different states of C. Based on findings with other “disorders” of C (e.g., see Laureys, 2005; Laureys, Lemaire, Maquet, Phillips, & Franck, 1999; Laureys, Owen, & Schiff, 2004; Laureys et al., 1999, 2000), these highly…”
- How default is the default mode of brain function? Further evidence from intrinsic BOLD signal fluctuations. (2006, background): “In this context, we note that metabolic ysfunction of the default-mode brain regions, in particular the recuneus and MPFC is common in patients in a vegetative or inimally conscious state (Laureys, 2005; Laureys, Owen, & chiff, 2004).”
- The Conscious Id (2013, background): “Neuroimaging of vegetative state (VS) patients identified brain areas that still show activation during external stimulation, but this activation is limited to subcortical and “low-level” primary cortical areas, disconnected from the frontoparietal network necessary for awareness/consciousness (Laur”
- Insects have the capacity for subjective experience (2016, background): “SI is considered to be involved principally in the spatial localisation of pain and is perhaps only indirectly responsible for pain sensation by conveying neural activity to other cortical regions (Laureys, 2005; Neirhaus et al., 2015).”
- Breakdown of within- and between-network Resting State Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Connectivity during Propofol-induced Loss of Consciousness (2010, result): “These results are coherent with previous positron emission tomography studies typically showing a selective frontoparietal metabolic impairment, compared with a relative preservation of specialized sensory cortices in altered states of consciousness.(19,22,57,58) Our findings could fit the global wo”
- The Neurocircuitry of Impaired Insight in Drug Addiction (2009, positive): “The anterior cingulate cortex, which comprises several parts that are unique in terms of cytoarchitecture and neurotransmitter receptor organization [27], is also part of this network implicated in conscious and subjective experiences (such as pain) [ 28 ].”
- Two Distinct Neuronal Networks Mediate the Awareness of Environment and of Self (2011, background): “For example, in the vegetative state (a state of arousal without awareness, Laureys, 2005), systematic metabolic dysfunctions have been identified in a wide fronto-parietal network encompassing the bilateral lateral and frontal regions, the bilateral parieto-temporal and posterior parietal areas, po”
- Recovery of cortical effective connectivity and recovery of consciousness in vegetative patients (2012, neutral): “Theoretical consider- ations (Tononi, 2004; Laureys, 2005; Dehaene et al., 2006; Tononi and Koch, 2008; Seth et al., 2008) as well as experimental data (Del Cul et al., 2007; Alkire et al., 2008) suggest that a basic requirement for consciousness is that multiple, specialized areas of the…”
- Decoupling of the brain's default mode network during deep sleep (2009, background): “Thus, the deepsleep condition allowed strong, ecologically valid modulation of the level of consciousness without resorting to the less-natural conditions of absence seizure, coma, or anesthesia (20).”
- Default network connectivity reflects the level of consciousness in non-communicative brain-damaged patients. (2010, background): “More generally, the finding of decreased DMN connectivity in proportion to impairment of consciousness is consistent with previous findings of metabolic impairment of a large frontoparietal network, encompassing main nodes of the DMN, in patients in vegetative state compared with controls, as well a”
- Why fish do not feel pain (2016, background): “SI is considered to be involved principally in the spatial localisation of pain and is perhaps only indirectly responsible for pain sensation by conveying neural activity to other cortical regions (Laureys, 2005; Neirhaus et al., 2015).”
- From unresponsive wakefulness to minimally conscious PLUS and functional locked-in syndromes: recent advances in our understanding of disorders of consciousness (2011, background): “How do we quantify consciousness at the bedside [32]? Consciousness is a multifaceted concept that can be reduced into two major dimensions: arousal (i.e., wakefulness or vigilance) and awareness (i.e., comprising all subjective perceptions, feelings and thoughts) [ 33 ].”
- Neural correlates of perceptual consciousness from within: A narrative review of human intracranial research (2025, unknown): “…levels of consciousness, defined as a global level of arousal or wakefulness (e.g., being awake vs. under anesthesia), and the contents of consciousness, defined as the specific subjective experiences one has while conscious (e.g., perceiving a visual stimulus; Bayne et al., 2016 ; Laureys, 2005 ).”
- Distinct Spectral Profiles of Awake Resting EEG in Disorders of Consciousness: The Role of Frequency and Topography of Oscillations (2022, background): “It is believed that the thalamocortical system supports the mechanisms necessary for performing these behaviors (Laureys 2005; Schiff 2010; Gammel et al. 2023).”