Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How?

By Yishay Yafeh, Oved Yosha. 2003

226 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bc44d014f45756b5c2690f67b8d8eaf5ef44f761

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Investment, R&D and Liquidity Constraints (2002, unknown): “A recent strand of research investigates the role of different stakeholders in dealing with agency problems, see Yafeh and Yosha (2002) and Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001).”
Corporate Governance: What’s Special About Banks? (2013, background): “Banks are also major creditors to the real economy, even sitting on corporate boards in their capacity as major investors in countries such as Germany and Japan (Gorton & Schmid 2000, Franks & Mayer 2001, Yafeh & Yosha 2003).”
Nonparametric Estimation of an Additive Quantile Regression Model (2004, methodology): “Yafeh and Yosha (2003) used a sample of Japanese firms in the chemical industry to examine whether “concentrated shareholding is associated with lower expenditure on activities with scope for managerial private benefits.” In this section we concentrate on only one of the regressions considered by Ya”
Stewardship or Agency? A Social Embeddedness Reconciliation of Conduct and Performance in Public Family Businesses (2011, background): “, pension funds and banks) appeared to dampen returns, perhaps because of the conservative restrictions they often impose on uncertain growth initiatives (Yafeh and Yosha 2003).”
Do the Type and Number of Blockholders Influence R&D Investments? New evidence from Spain (2007, unknown): “While some studies showed a positive relationship between large shareholders and R&D investment (Hosono et al., 2004; Wahal and McConnell, 2000), others found negative (Yafeh and Yosha, 2003; Jones and Danbolt, 2003) or neutral associations (Francis and Smith, 1995; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988).”
Japanese keiretsu: Past, present, future (2009, background): “While one argument is that these premiums reflect compensation for bank monitoring, several authors have challenged the extent of actual monitoring undertaken by banks (Beck & Levine, 2002; Yafeh & Yosha, 2003 ).”
Who Disciplines Bank Managers? (2009, unknown): “Research for other industries suggests that concentrated shareholding indeed improves monitoring (see Yafeh and Yosha (2003) for evidence from the Japanese chemical industry).”