Do Corporate Venture Capitalists Add Value to Start‐Up Firms? Evidence from IPOs and Acquisitions of VC‐Backed Companies
By Vladimir I. Ivanov, Feixue Xie. 2010
165 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bbdc4478d55240ab22db20d5cfdb3a3f7b74beed
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- F. Bertoni
- Luca Grilli
- A. Quas
- Samuele Murtinu
- Tereza Tykvová
- Massimo G. Colombo
- Douglas J. Cumming
- X. Tian
In Management of Technology and Innovation
- A. Quas
- Massimo G. Colombo
- Luca Grilli
- F. Bertoni
- Tereza Tykvová
- Samuele Murtinu
- X. Tian
- Douglas J. Cumming
Citations in the corpus
- Governmental and independent venture capital investments in Europe: a firm-level performance analysis (2017, background): “Even though the most popular database in the VC literature is the Thomson One database, this latter is known to under-represent investments made by non independent VCs (Ivanov and Xie, 2010: p. 135), especially in Europe.”
- Government, Venture Capital and the Growth of European High-Tech Entrepreneurial Firms (2014, result): “…data collection process that was pursued to build up the VICO dataset enables a better coverage of investments that were made by nonindependent VCs (including GVCs), especially in Europe, compared with the collections that are usually achieved by commercial databases (Ivanov and Xie, 2010: p. 135).”
- Does governmental venture capital spur invention and innovation? Evidence from young European biotech companies (2015, background): “In particular, they tend to overrepresent the role of IVC investors and give only partial coverage of captive investors (e.g., Ivanov and Xie, 2010; Da Gbadij et al., 2014).”
- The patterns of venture capital investment in Europe (2015, background): “In particular, they tend to over-represent the role of IVC investors and give only partial coverage of, and often mischaracterize, captive investors (e.g., Ivanov and Xie 2010; Da Gbadij et al. 2014).”
- The Role of Venture Capital Syndication in Value Creation for Entrepreneurial Firms (2012, methodology): “Specifically, Ivanov and Xie (2010) show that VC-backed IPO firms enjoy a positive and significant monthly alpha in the range from 0.91 to 4.49 (depending on the way the portfolios are constructed and the type of VC investors), using the Fama–French three factor models as the benchmark.”
- Corporate Venture Capital, Value Creation, and Innovation (2014, unknown): “likely to go public (Gompers and Lerner, 2000, Gompers, 2002), obtain higher valuation at the IPO date (Ivanov and Xie, 2010), attract more reputable financial market players during the IPO process and have better post-IPO long-run stock returns (Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian, 2011).”
- Investment, Duration, and Exit Strategies for Corporate and Independent Venture Capital‐Backed Start‐Ups (2015, unknown): “Also, when the start-ups have a strategic fit with the parent corporation of the CVCs, they receive higher takeover premiums when they become acquisition targets (Ivanov and Xie, 2010).”