Secure pebblenets
By Stefano Basagni, Kris Herrin, D. Bruschi, E. Rosti. ACM Interational Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, 2001
309 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bbaa6136bfbde3f4aacf7828ea1a8a6a2608e2bc
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Peng Ning
- Jean-Pierre Hubaux
- Adrian Perrig
- Sencun Zhu
- Donggang Liu
- Sushil Jajodia
- Sanjeev Setia
- Yanchao Zhang
Citations in the corpus
- Secure aggregation for wireless networks (2003, background): “We regard confidentiality of the messages themselves to be unnecessary and focus only on the integrity of the results transmitted to the base station.”
- URSA: ubiquitous and robust access control for mobile ad hoc networks (2004, background): “Attackers are mainly outsiders of the system, and many such attacks can be resisted through authentication protocols, assuming key management is in place [2], [20], [21], [31], [35], [42].”
- SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks (2001, methodology): “proposed to use a network-wide symmetric key to secure an ad hoc routing protocol [2].”
- Multilevel μTESLA: Broadcast authentication for distributed sensor networks (2004, background): “Based on the assumption of tamper-resistant hardware, Basagni et al. presented a key management scheme to periodically update the symmetric keys shared by all sensor nodes [Basagni et al. 2001].”
- PIKE: peer intermediaries for key establishment in sensor networks (2005, methodology): “propose to use a network-wide symmetric key to secure an ad-hoc routing protocol [2].”
- SEAD: secure efficient distance vector routing for mobile wireless ad hoc networks (2002, background): “Heffernan [15] and Basagni et al [3] use shared keys to secure routing communication, which is vulnerable to some single-node compromises.”
- How to misuse AODV: a case study of insider attacks against mobile ad-hoc routing protocols (2003, methodology): “employed a network-wide secret key to secure the routing messages [25].”
- LEAP: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks (2003, methodology): “The protocol used for establishing and updating these keys is communication-and energy-e.cient, and minimizes the involvement of the base station.”
- Random key-assignment for secure Wireless Sensor Networks (2003, background): “Note that sending a message consumes more energy than receiving a message [22], and this is a parameter of interest in designing a key establishment protocol.”
- Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols (2003, background): “Other areas in secure ad hoc network routing have been explored, such as trust establishment [2, 16, 17, 42], key generation [3], nodes that maliciously do not forward packets [27], and security requirements for forwarding nodes [44].”
- Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks (2002, background): “Basagni et al [2] use a network-wide symmetric key to secure routing communication, which is vulnerable to a single node compromise, although they specify the use of secure hardware to limit the damage that can be done by a compromised node.”
- A cooperative intrusion detection system for ad hoc networks (2003, background): “, [29, 10, 31, 3], can be used as the first line of defense against attacks in MANET.”
- Sensor network security: a survey (2009, background): “In this type of key management, some use the physical hierarchical structure of networks such as [57]-[63], while others [64], [65] implement their hierarchy key management logically in physical flat structure sensor networks, which only include a base station and sensors.”
- Anonymous communications in mobile ad hoc networks (2005, background): “The first one is to use a network-wide key shared by all the nodes [17], but this approach is vulnerable to single node compromise.”
- Secure routing in wireless sensor networks: attacks and countermeasures (2003, background): “In the following sections we outline our assumptions about the underlying network, propose models for different classes of adversaries, and consider security goals in this setting.”
- Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks (2003, background): “presented a key management scheme to secure the communication by periodica lly updating the symmetric keys shared by all sensor nodes [1].”
- ANODR: anonymous on demand routing with untraceable routes for mobile ad-hoc networks (2003, methodology): “[2] use a netwo rkwide symmetric key to secure routing information.”
- LEAP+: Efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks (2006, methodology): “Several solutions based on predeployed keying have been proposed in the literature, including approaches based on the use of a global key shared by all nodes [Basagni et al. 2001; Carman et al. 2000], approaches in which every node shares a unique key with the base station [Perrig et al.”
- Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks (2005, background): “presented a key management scheme to secure th e communication by periodically updating the symmetric keys shared by all sensor nodes [Basagni et al. 2001].”
- Statistical en-route filtering of injected false data in sensor networks (2004, background): “Other disruptions, such as recording and replaying legitimate reports or injecting false 1 Tamper-resistant hardware can prevent the exposure of stored secrets when a node is captured by attackers [5]. control packets, are also possibilities.”