Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards

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Household Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies (2015, result): “There is little evidence that plain-vanilla market power is important, but the evidence on price dispersion (Section III-C) is consistent with lenders enjoying market power due to search and/or switch costs (see also Knittel and Stango (2003) on tacit collusion).”
The Economics of Credit Cards, Debit Cards and Atms: A Survey and Some New Evidence (2008, unknown): “Using this institutional detail, Knittel and Stango (2003) examine if credit card providers resort to tacit collusion by using the interest rate level of the binding ceiling in some states as the focal point for interest rates in those states that did not have binding ceilings.”
Entrepreneurial finance, credit cards, and race☆ (2012, methodology): “We first examine data from Knittel and Stango (2003) on state-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of credit card companies.”