Show Me the Money: Interjurisdiction Political Competition and Fiscal Extraction in China

By Xiaobo Lü, P. Landry. American Political Science Review, 2014

207 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder (2018, background): “Following Lü and Landry (2014), we also control for the intensity of local political competition—the number of jurisdictions within a given higher level administrative jurisdiction k.”
Racing to the Bottom or to the Top? Decentralization, Revenue Pressures, and Governance Reform in China (2017, unknown): “Further exacerbating the pressures felt by local authorities, recent scholarship suggests that one of the most important determinants of advancement within China’s party-state hierarchy is revenue generation (Shih, Adolph and Liu, 2012; Lu and Landry, 2014; Kung and Chen, 2014).”
Developing by borrowing? Inter-jurisdictional competition, land finance and local debt accumulation in China (2017, background): “…system’ and local officials’ political promotion (Shih et al., 2012), other scholars have provided empirical evidence on the relationship between the turnover of local officials and their economic performance (Chen et al., 2005; Feng et al., 2012, Guo, 2009; Li and Zhou, 2005; Lu and Landry, 2014).”
Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China ☆ (2016, background): “Those who were able to increase this revenue source more than the average may stand a better chance of promotion (Lü and Landry, 2014).”