Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung

By D. Braess. 1968

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Citations in the corpus

Challenges for Transparency (2017, methodology): “We illustrate these ideas with a striking example of Braess’ paradox (Braess, 1968) as given by Kelly (1991).”
To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems (2002, background): “/M/1 124 6.3 Arrivals to scheduled batch service 127 6.4 Retrials 130 6.4.1 Steady-state probabilities 131 6.4.2 Social optimality 133 6.4.3 Equilibrium 133 6.5 Related literature 137”
Statistical physics of vaccination (2016, result): “Namely, intermediate values of δ lead to a larger epidemic size and a higher collective cost, which is similar to the well-known Braess’s paradox [551, 552].”
Sensitivity analysis of separable traffic equilibrium equilibria with application to bilevel optimization in network design (2007, background): “The network of Braess (1968) (see Figure 3) is classic in the analysis of system optimal solutions.”
Opportunities for multiagent systems and multiagent reinforcement learning in traffic control (2009, background): “Since the concept of Wardrop’s equilibrium [90], traffic engineers face the problem of deleterious oscillatory behaviors caused by externalities and agents not facing the consequence of their individual choices [8,9,14].”
How bad is selfish routing? (2000, background): “This is the setting in which Braess s paradox was originally discovered [Braess 1968; Murchland 1970], and several subsequent papers focused entirely on this model [Frank 1981; Steinberg and Zangwill 1983].”
Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War (2015, background): “This result, known as Braess’s paradox (1968), occurs for 15% of the edges in the congested trafficking equilibrium.”
Changes in Transport and Non Transport Costs: Local vs. Global Impacts in a Spatial Network (2007, background): “If (9) holds as a strict inequality for country j, nj = 0 in equilibrium since no firm can break even there, whereas nj ≥ 0 otherwise.”
Selfish routing and the price of anarchy (2005, background): “Pigou discovered the first example in 1920 [58]; Braess found the second in 1968 [11].”
Supply chain network design under profit maximization and oligopolistic competition (2010, background): “Moreover, as is well-known, intuition in the case of equilibrium problems, as opposed to optimization problems, may be easily confounded (as in the Braess paradox; see Braess (1968) and Braess, Nagurney, and Wakolbinger (2005)).”
Discovering Options for Exploration by Minimizing Cover Time (2019, background): “Even a good solution is hard to ﬁnd due to the Braess’s paradox (Braess, 1968; Braess et al., 2005) which states that the expected cover time does not monotonically decrease as edges are added to the graph.”
Optimal Transport for Applied Mathematicians: Calculus of Variations, PDEs, and Modeling (2015, background): “Moreover, a famous counter-example due to Braess (see [77]) shows that it may be the case that adding an extra road with very small cost on which the traveling time is aways zero leads to an equilibrium where the total commuting time is increased! This illustrates the striking difference between eff”