The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation

By Andrea Ichino, R. Riphahn. 2001

231 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/baa3fb67e46b090c667abe41a8801f23fe62c114

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Two‐Tier Labour Markets in the Great Recession: France Versus Spain-super- (2012, unknown): “26 For example, Ichino and Riphahn (2005) have shown that the number of days of absence per week increases significantly once employment protection is granted at the end of the probation period.”
Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort (2003, background): “Our results confirm the existence of contract-based incentives for temporary contracts: Temporarily employed individuals are significantly more likely to provide unpaid overtime 5 See e.g. Ichino and Riphahn (2001), Barmby et al. (1991), and Nagin et al. (2002).”
Two-Tier Labor Markets in the Great Recession: France vs. Spain (2010, unknown): “N∗ a +N ∗ p = u∗θq(θ) μF (εd) [1− pF (ε)] σ + μF (ε ) σ (25)”
Biological Gender Differences, Absenteeism and the Earning Gap (2006, unknown): “This dataset was also used by Ichino and Maggi (2000), Ichino, Polo and Rettore (2003) and Ichino and Riphahn (2004).”
A Natural Experiment on Sick Pay Cuts, Sickness Absence, and Labor Costs (2010, unknown): “Workplace conditions are relevant (Dionne and Dostie, 2007) as are probation periods, employment protection, and economic upswings or downturns (Riphahn, 2004; Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Askildsen et al., 2005).”
The Effect of Employment Protection Legislation and Financial Market Imperfections on Investment: Evidence from a Firm-Level Panel of EU Countries (2009, unknown): “9 Ichino and Riphahn (2005) and Riphahn (2005) claim that layoff protection (or the lack thereof during the probation period) might also affect productivity by reducing worker effort because there is less threat of layoff in response to poor w rk performance or absenteeism. b) Considerations…”
Absenteeism and Employment Protection: Three Case Studies * (2004, methodology): “Our third case study is analyzed in Ichino and Riphahn (2003). In that paper, to which we refer the reader interested in more details, we test the effect of employment protection on absenteeism in a sample of employees who are observed during their first year of tenure at an Italian bank. This bank ”