Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort

By Axel Engellandt, R. Riphahn. Social Science Research Network, 2003

343 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Temporary contracts provide employers with a tool to screen potential new employees and have been shown to provide "stepping stones" into permanent employment for workers. For both reasons workers on temporary contracts have an incentive to provide more effort than permanent employees. Using indicators for unpaid overtime work and absences taken from the Swiss Labor Force Survey we present evidence that temporary workers indeed provide higher effort than permanent employees: Their probability of working unpaid overtime exceeds that of permanently employed workers by 60 percent. We show the heterogeneity of this effect across different types of temporary contracts, investigate differences between men and women, and discuss the relevance of adverse selection into temporary employment.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Health Professions

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aa565efd27e9d5d106c3d61b2b12c90519252189

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In Economics and Econometrics

In General Health Professions

Citations in the corpus

Setting It Right: Employment Protection, Labour Reallocation and Productivity (2011, background): “…of their contract into open-ended relationships is low (Dolado and Stucchi 2008), although they might be more motivated when the latter is high (Engellandt and Riphahn 2005). with new technologies, characterized by higher mean returns but also higher variance, in order to avoid the risk of…”
Literature Review of Theory and Research on the Psychological Impact of Temporary Employment: Towards a Conceptual Model (2008, neutral): “Engellandt and Riphahn (2005), however, find the opposite pattern.”
Absenteeism and Employment Protection: Three Case Studies * (2004, methodology): “…of and proxy for worker effort and productivity and as such, it is used as a measure of individual response to numerous incentive schemes at the firm and national level (see e.g. Riphahn and Thalmaier, 2001; Flabbi and Ichino, 2001; Ichino and Riphahn, 2003; or Engellandt and Riphahn, 2003).”
Educational choices and the selection process: before and after compulsory schooling (2012, positive): “According to Engellandt and Riphahn ( 2005 ), temporary employees have an incentive to display high levels of effort, as firms tend to use temporary employment to screen potential permanent employees prior to committing to a binding contract.”