Relaxation algorithms to find Nash equilibria with economic applications
By J. Krawczyk, Stanislav Uryasev. 2000
230 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computational Theory and Mathematics, Economics and Econometrics, Numerical Analysis
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ba57007da9320450540eb9f38429e0ad86240b61
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Computational Theory and Mathematics
- Masao Fukushima
- Katsunori Kubota
- Jong-Shi Pang
- Francisco Facchinei
- Dang Van Hieu
- Yura Malitsky
- Aviv Gibali
- Angelia Nedić
In Economics and Econometrics
- Masao Fukushima
- Katsunori Kubota
- Guiomar Martín-Herrán
- Georges Zaccour
- Steffen Jørgensen
- Javier Contreras
- Francisco Facchinei
- Rafal Weron
In Numerical Analysis
- Masao Fukushima
- Katsunori Kubota
- Jong-Shi Pang
- Francisco Facchinei
- Dang Van Hieu
- Yura Malitsky
- Aviv Gibali
- Angelia Nedić
Citations in the corpus
- Gap Function Approach to the Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (2010, background): “many applications such as electric power models [14, 19] and river basin pollution games [12, 15, 16 ].”
- Generalized Nash equilibrium problems (2007, unknown): “…that uses the recursion xk+1 := (1− tk)xk + tk yk, where yk is an element of the set Ŷ(xk) defined in (8) and where the stepsize tk satisfies the conditions tk ∈ (0, 1] ∀k ∈ N, tk → 0, ∞∑ k=0 tk = ∞, or (Krawczyk and Uryasev 2000) the (optimal) choice tk := arg min t∈(0,1] V̂ ( (1− t)xk + t yk).”
- Sequential Estimation of Structural Models with a Fixed Point Constraint (2008, unknown): “5 Ba sar (1987) and Krawczyk and Uryasev (2000) apply the relaxation method to nd a Nash equilibrium of a game.”
- Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution (2009, background): “For a survey of numerical solutions to normalized equilibrium problems, see [131], and for their computations, see [132].”
- Numerical solutions to Nash-Cournot equilibria in coupled constraint electricity markets (2004, background): “…form) is defined as a three-tuple , where is the set of players; , , is the set of strategies (or strategy space) of player ; and , is the payoff (or welfare, utility, profit, etc.) function of player that assigns a real number to each element of the Cartesian product of the strategy spaces .”
- Exact penalty functions for generalized Nash problems (2006, background): “On the other hand there is certainly a wealth of interesting applications that call for the solution of GNEPs: see, as a way of example, [4,10, 13 ,17,18]”