Numerical solutions to Nash-Cournot equilibria in coupled constraint electricity markets

By Javier Contreras, Matthias Klusch, Jacek B. Krawczyk. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2004

294 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Generalized Nash equilibrium problems (2007, unknown): “The relaxation method has been applied successfully to some applications of NEPs and GNEPs, see, e.g., (Adida and Perakis 2006a, b; Berridge and Krawczyk 1997; Contreras et al. 2004; Krawczyk 2005; Krawczyk and Uryasev 2000).”
On generalized Nash games and variational inequalities (2007, background): “Basically, if one restricts to algorithms that are guaranteed to find a solution by performing well defined tasks and by solving subproblems that are surely solvable, they boil down to two: the relaxation algorithm (see for example [3,5,6,10,11,14,16]) and the reduction to an MPEC problem (see [13] ”
Non-cooperative game theory based energy management systems for energy district in the retail market considering DER uncertainties (2016, methodology): “57 [13] has focused on minimizing the locational marginal price 58 of purchasers by using different evolutional algorithms and 59 adding decision modules based on game theory.”
A projection algorithm for solving pseudomonotone equilibrium problems and it's application to a class of bilevel equilibria (2013, methodology): “We test Algorithm 1 for this problem with corresponds to the first model in [28] where three companies (nc = 3) are considered, and the parameters are given in Tables 1 and 2 We implement Algorithm 1 in Matlab R2008a running on a Laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) i3CPU M330 2.”