THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

By Bob Beddor, Sam Carter, Ivano Ciardelli, Kevin Dorst, Paul Égré, Adam Elga, C. Fenwick, Jane Friedman, S. Goldstein, Ben Hol-guín and 7 more. 2004

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Citations in the corpus

Counterfactuals in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): Evidence from Human Reasoning (2019, background): “Counterfactual and causal inferences have long been considered two sides of the same coin [Hume, 1739/1978; Lewis, 1973].”
Learning Representations for Counterfactual Inference (2016, background): “The problem of causal inference is often framed in terms of counterfactual questions (Lewis, 1973; Rubin, 1974; Pearl, 2009) such as “Would this patient have lower blood sugar had she received a different medication?””
Biodynamic ontology: applying BFO in the biomedical domain. (2004, background): “In the terms of Zemach [45], continuants are said to be bound with respect to space.”
Ifs, Ands, and Buts: An Incremental Truthmaker Semantics for Indicative Conditionals (2016, background): “29[Shope(1978)] 30Huw Price makes a related suggestion about conditional probability itself, based on a remark of Ramsey’s: “The degree of belief in p given q is not the same as the degree to which a subject would believe p, if he believed q for certain; for knowledge of q might for psychological re”
Conditional logic of actions and causation (2004, background): “Traditionally, considering a conditional as a causal implication has frequently attracted the attention of researchers in conditional logic and in AI ([21] [22] [33]).”
Number theory and elementary arithmetic (2003, unknown): “Many (e.g. Tait [76]) take primitive recursive arithmetic, PRA, to be a reasonable formalization of Hilbert's informal notion of " finitary " reasoning, and those that dispute this identification typically maintain that finitary reasoning is properly stronger.”