Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance
By Raj Chetty. 2009
335 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b5bcd5147664ca14b826fed5f427605796e72694
How researchers see this paper
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Nathaniel Hendren
- H. Kleven
- C. Kreiner
- Emmanuel Saez
- B. Heim
- Jon M. Bakija
- Adam J. Cole
- Jesse M. Rothstein
In Gender Studies
- Nathaniel Hendren
- H. Kleven
- C. Kreiner
- Emmanuel Saez
- Jesse M. Rothstein
- Marte Knudsen
- Søren Pedersen
- T. V. Wachter
Citations in the corpus
- "Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and the Causes of Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Tax Return Data." (2012, background): “…certain assumptions, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax-share can be a sufficient statistic to calculate the deadweight loss caused by income tax.5 5 See, however, Chetty (2008) and Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) for discussion of why these assumptions may not hold.”
- Public Provision of Private Goods and Nondistortionary Marginal Tax Rates (2009, neutral): “See also Chetty (2008) for a recent re-assessment of the taxable income elasticity as the correct measure of excess burden in the presence of evasion and avoidance.”
- Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings (2019, neutral): “See Feldstein (1999), Chetty (2009), and the related discussion in Khan, Khwaja, and Olken (2016).”
- Hourly Wage Rate and Taxable Labor Income Responsiveness to Changes in Marginal Tax Rates (2010, neutral): “Chetty (2009) for a more general model. 5 See Appendix A for a detailed description of the tax and transfer system. 6 In our estimation sample, 3 men and 2 women were located at kink points in 1981. Since the marginal tax rates are not defined for these, we have deleted these few observations in the”
- The Policy Elasticity (2016, background): “Finally, this paper is also related to the recent literature on sufficient statistics (Chetty (2009b)) and in particular the sufficiency of the taxable income elasticity (Feldstein (1999); Chetty (2009a)).”
- The elasticity of corporate taxable income: new evidence from UK tax records (2014, background): “…form and therefore begin liable to corporation tax on its pro t. 4 Section 2 provides a conceptual framework for analysing the elasticity of corporate taxable income with respect to the statutory rate, which draws on the personal tax literature of, for example, Feldstein (1999) and Chetty (2009).”
- Social Experiments in the Labor Market (2016, positive): “A more recent, closely related approach is known as the “sufficient statistics” approach (Chetty 2009).”
- Unwilling or unable to cheat? evidence from a randomized tax audit experiment in Denmark (2010, background): “35This distinction is relevant both because the efficiency implications of evasion and avoidance in general are not the same (Slemrod, 1995; Chetty, 2009), and because the evasion response to the marginal tax rate may provide a better understanding of the correct modeling of tax evasion and…”
- Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records (2011, neutral): “We present someresults onresponses totaxreforms ina two-periodextension of this stylized model in Online Appendix A.7”