Local taxes, national politics and spatial interactions in English district election results

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Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands (2005, background): “Revelli (2002b).”
Value for money? German local government efficiency in a comparative perspective (2011, background): “The reason is that such models generally normalize the provision of public goods to one (cf. Besley and Case, 1995; Revelli, 2002; Geys and Vermeir, 2008c), which implies that the ‘lower cost of provision can be interpreted as higher government efficiency’ (Geys and Vermeir, 2008c, p.”
Yardstick competition and the political costs of raising taxes: An empirical analysis of Spanish municipalities (2007, unknown): “These results are consistent with those obtained by Revelli (2002) for the UK.”
On Spatial Public Finance Empirics (2005, background): “Shocks to incumbents’ popularity will then be correlated with the local tax, with incumbents trying to counterbalance those shocks by varying their policies and adapting them to their perceived popularity ( Revelli, 2002a ).”