Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies

By J. Hellman, Geraint Jones, Daniel A. Kaufmann. 2003

664 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b5107d221bce7b9cbc025505d95eaef3d919c7d0

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Citations in the corpus

The Effect of Corruption on Investment Growth: Evidence from Firms in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Transition Countries (2009, background): “5 Hellman et al. (2002) conclude that in highly-corrupt Transition countries, firms that engage in corrupt practices tend to grow substantially faster than other firms.”
In the name of charity: Political connections and strategic corporate social responsibility in a transition economy (2015, background): “4 willing to supply financial assistance in the form of CSR as they desire a close connection with the government and anticipate reduced transaction costs of dealing with government regulations (Hellman et al., 2003; Li et al., 2006).”
LEGAL CORRUPTION: LEGAL CORRUPTION (2011, background): “Hellman et al. (2003) assess these concepts and conclude that, in their transition-country data, captor firms enjoyed clear private advantages in association with aggregate social costs.”
Sheltering Corporate Assets from Political Extraction (2013, background): “…Bliss and Di Tella (1997) and Ades and Di Tella (1999) who study the effect of corruption on market structure, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Hellman et al. (2003) who examine the interactions among ﬁrms and politicians in which ﬁrms both react to and help shape the political environment in…”
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth (2005, neutral): “their advantage, inducing what Hellman et al. (2003) call state capture – the acquisition of control over the organs of the state by corporate oligarchs If such initial conditions induce weak institutions, these may well further limit future investment opportunities and alter political”
Why Do Firms Bribe? (2010, methodology): “We therefore see high arbitrariness as equivalent to high opacity of exposure; firms cannot determine the degree of corruption exposure facing them in a particular country, industry or activity.”
State-owned MNCs and host country expropriation risk: The role of home state soft power and economic gunboat diplomacy (2014, background): “It is apparent that the advantageous position accorded by political relations is more accessible to those with formidable political ties (Hellman et al., 2003).”