The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations

By Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Larry H. P. Lang. 2000

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Citations in the corpus

The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (2008, neutral): “…and Wolfenzon, 2002) and prior evidence (La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002) show that ownership concentration is lower in countries with better investor protection.”
Earnings and dividend informativeness when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights (2005, methodology): “Based on Collins and Kothari’s [1989] finding that the market-tobook ratio is positively associated with earnings informativeness, we include the market-to-book ratio in our regressions to control for the effects of investment opportunities on informativeness. Leverage. Grullon and Kantas [2001] rep”
Financial flexibility, corporate investment and performance: evidence from financial crises (2013, neutral): “We match firms in this sample with those from the study of Claessens et al. (2000) to obtain information on business group affiliation, the magnitude of separation between cash flow and control rights, the identity of the largest shareholder, and the role of CEOs and other senior managers as…”
Ownership Structure and Firm Value in China's Privatized Firms: 1991-2001 (2005, neutral): “1 See Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Denis and Denis (1994), Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Loderer and Martin (1997), Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998), and Cho (1998).”
Maturation of Corporate Governance Research, 1993-2007: An Assessment (2009, background): “Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2001) emphasize that the reason they can perform their analysis is due to board structures in the UK being different from the US.”
Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective ☆ (2007, background): “3 For example, Claessens et al. (2000), Bertrand et al. (2002), Bae et al. (2002), Bai et al. (2004a), and Firedman et al. (2003) all provide empirical evidence of tunneling by controlling shareholders in emerging markets.”
Emerging multinationals from mid-range economies: the influence of institutions and factor markets (2013, background): “In Southeast Asia and elsewhere, family owners and other blockholders have been identified as an important governance constituency that can shape strategic decisions, including internationalization (Boyd and Hoskisson, 2010; Claessens et al., 2000; Filatotchev et al., 2012; Globerman et al., 2011; L”
Cash dividend policy, corporate pyramids, and ownership structure: Evidence from China (2013, background): “, 2003) and significant in countries and regions with weaker laws and undeveloped economies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000).”
The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings (2011, positive): “…of the voting rights of the second-largest shareholder to the voting rights of the largest shareholder, VOTE2/VOTE1 Authors’ calculations based on Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) VOTE231 Ratio of the voting rights of the second- and third-largest shareholders to the…”