Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty
By Himanshu Jha. 2012
611 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b4910fd0400f0c3aa35520fa29d7177f7357b46a
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Citations in the corpus
- Fiscal Capacity and the Quality of Government in Sub-Saharan Africa (2013, background): “See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) for a recent and comprehensive discussion of these issues.”
- State capitalism in international context: Varieties and variations (2020, unknown): “Political science research has long argued that political institutions are a key determinant of the extent and form of economic and social prosperity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012); similar arguments should be introduced into research on state capitalism.”
- Innovation Systems for Transformations towards Sustainability? Taking the Normative Dimension Seriously (2017, unknown): “Aside from the substantive value of participation [191], mobilizing many actors at multiple scales can create legitimacy in general [192,193] and for sustainability goals [19,81,194,195] of an IS in particular.”
- The Power of the Street: Evidence from Egypt's Arab Spring (2017, background): “…in order to deal with popular pressures or even institutional constraints on their power, thus recreating some of the initial advantages and privileges they had via different channels (this also builds on Michael’s’s Iron Law of Oligarchy, 1966, as discussed in Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)).”
- Economic and political institutions and entry into formal and informal entrepreneurship (2014, unknown): “Yet, institutional scholars have shown that political institutions can have far-reaching impact on the operation of economic systems and societal wealth creation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Farr, Lord, & Wolfenbarger, 1998; North, 1993; Weingast, 1995, 1997).”
- The Economic Effects of the Abolition of Serfdom: Evidence from the Russian Empire (2018, unknown): “…distorted incentives and suboptimal resource allocation (see, e.g., Cairnes 1862; Williams 1944; North and Thomas 1973; Anderson and Gallman 1977; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Ogilvie 2013), there is no clear theoretical argument for why slave- and land-owners failed to provide efficient…”