Earnings Restatements: A Capital Market Perspective

By Min Wu. 2002

152 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b47014338ea805d0173475d53b968b3ed9f2c1c9

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Citations in the corpus

Determinants of Market Reactions to Restatement Announcements (2001, unknown): “Additionally, estimated returns are 11 percent for 255 companies either revising earnings announcements or announcing restatements of financials from 1977 to 2000 (Wu, 2002), 10 percent for a sample of 689 public companies announcing restatements from 1997 to March 2002 (GAO, 2002), and 3.”
How Much Will Firms Pay for Earnings that Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings (2004, background): “Further, the fact that an increasing number of firms have been required to restate their financial statements (Wu, 2002) suggests that tax costs are not a sufficient deterrent to overstating earnings for these firms.”
Predicting Earnings Management: The Case of Earnings Restatements (2002, background): “Firms forced to restate earnings are also firms that have typically inflated revenue or inventory balances (Wu, 2002).”
SEC Enforcement: Does Forthright Disclosure and Cooperation Really Matter? (2012, unknown): “I expect that the SEC will sanction those firms whose shareholders suffered more harm.21 My final four proxies have been used in prior research to capture characteristics of the restatement (Wu 2002; Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004; Scholz 2008; Files et al. 2009).”
The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover (2004, unknown): “Similar results are reported by Anderson and Yohn (2002), Richardson et al. (2003), Wu (2002), and Hribar and Jenkins (2004).”
The Corporate Governance Mosaic and Financial Reporting Quality (2008, unknown): “This emphasis is due in part, to the prevalence of highly publicized and egregious financial reporting frauds such as Enron, WorldCom, Aldelphia, and Parmalat, an unprecedented number of earnings restatements (Loomis 1999; Wu 2002; Palmrose and Scholz 2002; Larcker et al. 2004) and claims of blatant”
CEOS ON THE EDGE: EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND STOCK-BASED INCENTIVE MISALIGNMENT (2008, background): “…auditors to litigation risk and reputational damage, turnover among top management within the company, prison sentences for top executives, filings for bankruptcy, and loss of investor confidence (Pratt & Stice, 1994; Richardson, Tuna, & Wu, 2002; Weber, Little, Henry, & Lavelle, 2001; Wu, 2002).”
Do Short Sellers Target Firms with Poor Earnings Quality? Evidence from Earnings Restatements (2006, unknown): “Similar results are reported by Anderson and Yohn (2002), Richardson, Tuna, and Wu (2003), Wu (2002) and Hribar and Jenkins (2004).”
Earnings Restatements, Changes in CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance (2008, background): “It is well-documented that restatements are associated with a decrease of about 10% in firm market value (GAO 2002; Palmrose et al. 2004; Wu 2002).”
Shareholder rights, financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital (2006, background): “7 Our conjecture is consistent with complementary theory, which suggests that these two governance mechanisms, strong shareholder rights and transparent disclosure policies are likely to interact with each other in affecting the cost of equity capital ( Cremers and Nair, 2004 ).”
Stealth Disclosure of Accounting Restatements (2009, unknown): “We also include four variables that have been used in prior studies to capture charac teristics of the restatement (Lev et al. 2008; Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004; Wu 2003).”