Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game

By J. Fuller, Michael C. Jensen. 2002

253 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Health Professions, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b38f0abd99af108fc13275b04e76abc9fa9404d0

Citations in the corpus

• Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance (2005, unknown): “…analysts such as Candace Browning (2006), head of global research at Merrill Lynch, the CFA Institute (Krehmeyer and Orsagh 2006) and academics (Fuller and Jensen 2002, Jensen, Murphy and Wruck 2004) to encourage managers to give up quarterly earnings guidance and hence avoid myopic managerial…”
• Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review and Framework (2008, unknown): “This change in behavior may be the result of market participants ͑CFA Institute 2006͒ and researchers such as Fuller and Jensen ͑2002͒ expressing concerns over managers using their forecasts to strategically manage analysts' consensus forecasts.”
• Tax Rates and Corporate Decision Making (2017, unknown): “2 We estimate MTRs using the approaches developed by Graham (1996a) and Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010).”
• The Dark Side of Analyst Coverage: The Case of Innovation (2013, unknown): “More importantly, just as Jensen and Fuller (2002) illustrate, firm managers all too often conform to excessively aggressive analysts’ earnings forecasts and accept external expectations as targets to achieve.”
• Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations (2008, unknown): “Kaplan (1989a) and Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) also show that accounting profits increase significantly following going private transactions.”
• CFOs versus CEOs: Equity Incentives and Crashes (2011, unknown): “Fuller and Jensen (2010) argue that”
• Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, unknown): “While the proportion of equity incentives offered to VPs is growing (see Fuller and Jensen, 2002), VPs also face increasing promotion-based tournament incentives over time.”
• Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management Activities Around Seasoned Equity Offerings (2010, unknown): “For example, Coffee (2003), Fuller and Jensen (2002), and Greenspan (2002), among others, assert that stock-based compensation and managerial ownership increased managers’ incentives to hype earnings and, consequently, stock prices, which contributed to the 1990s stock market bubble.9 Given the…”
• Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats (2005, unknown): “Today, Jensen (2002; Fuller & Jensen, 2002) accepts that the existing system of managing compensation, especially by the use of stock options, is seriously deficient; he argued that it has proven to be “managerial heroin,” encouraging a focus on shortterm highs, with destructive long-term…”
• Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods (2008, unknown): “This suggests that option compensation provide managers with incentives to manipulate earnings upwards (Fuller and Jensen, 2002, Greenspan 2002, and Coffee 2003), and this effect was significantly higher during the period surrounding the corporate scandals.”
• The Trouble with Stock Options (2003, unknown): “In Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002), we compare the company’s cost of granting employee stock options to the value of the same stock options to employees using 3 Binomial models can more accurately measure the company cost of options than the Black-Scholes formula because the binominal approach can…”
• Analyst Coverage and Real Earnings Management: Quasi-Experimental Evidence (2014, unknown): “, see Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003), Fuller and Jensen (2002), and Grundfest and Malenko (2012)). Conversely, do securities analysts serve as effective external monitors? As accounting and finance professionals with industry expertise, analysts process and disseminate information disclosed by ”