Causal judgment and moral judgment: Two experiments

By Joshua Knobe, B. Fraser. 2008

230 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b36c0b8ef9248ae6af3e7eba4b69bc27e105e21a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Citations in the corpus

Moral competence in social robots (2014, background): “But exactly what this affective response sets in motion is unclear: a marker that something important occurred [41]? A strengthened motivation to find the cause of the bad event [42]? Or a biased search for evidence that allows the perceiver to blame somebody [6]? And what do we make of the fact tha”
Cause by Omission and Norm: Not Watering Plants (2017, methodology): “An earlier experiment [Knobe and Fraser 2008] bolsters Hitchcock and Knobe’s theory.”
Do Social Norms Influence Causal Inferences? (2014, methodology): “According to these studies, people seem to view the behavior of an agent that violates a norm as more causal than one that conforms to norms (Alicke, 1992; Knobe & Fraser, 2008; Knobe & Hitchcock, 2009).”
Two types of typicality: rethinking the role of statistical typicality in ordinary causal attributions. (2012, background): “Knobe and Fraser (2008) understand Driver to be suggesting the second of these two hypotheses, namely “that it might be possible to explain all of the puzzling results by appealing to the concept of atypicality” (2008, 442).”
The role of prescriptive norms and knowledge in children's and adults' causal selection. (2016, methodology): “In the pen vignette by Knobe and Fraser (2008), for example, participants read about employees working in a philosophy department.”
Causal-explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions. (2010, background): “More recently, Knobe and Fraser (2008) considered cases of joint causation in which an outcome (e.g. a computer crash) required the actions of two agents (e.g. two people logging on), only one of whom was permitted to perform that action.”