Game Theory Evolving: a Problem-centered Introduction to Modeling Stratgeic Behavior [Review of: H. Gintis (2000) Game Theory Evolving: a Problem-centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Behavior]

By Harold Houba. 2001

221 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b254e949d765521d560341a6b78e83694200ac78

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Citations in the corpus

Agent-Based Modeling: A New Approach for Theory Building in Social Psychology (2007, unknown): ““Evolutionary game theory” (Gintis, 2000; Maynard Smith, 1982) examines the outcomes as a changing and adapting population of agents interacts with each other and with an environment over many simulated generations and analyzes the agent strategies that fare best in such competition.”
Learning to compete, coordinate, and cooperate in repeated games using reinforcement learning (2011, background): “For example, the folk theorem states that many repeated games have an inﬁnite number of NE of the repeated game (rNE) (Gintis 2000).”
Do sincere apologies need to be costly? Test of a costly signaling model of apology (2009, unknown): “A similar idea was proposed by an economist, Nelson (1974), to explain the utility of dissipative advertisements, whose cost, he supposed, is offset by repeat purchases only when the advertiser produces a high-quality good (see also Gintis, 2000, chapter 13).”
Autocurricula and the Emergence of Innovation from Social Interaction: A Manifesto for Multi-Agent Intelligence Research (2019, background): “Second, the high level strategies themselves change over time in response to the strategic choices of others (Gintis, 2000; North, 1991; Schluter, 2000; Smith and Price, 1973).”
Data Collection and Wireless Communication in Internet of Things (IoT) Using Economic Analysis and Pricing Models: A Survey (2016, background): “It was proved that the utility functions of the follower and the leaders are convex, and thus there exists a unique solution for the flow configuration and the relay pricing which is the Stackelberg equilibrium outcome of the game [148].”
Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology (2007, background): “A similar problem exists with evolutionary models that are not explicitly genetic, such as game theory models, which assume that the various individual strategies “breed true” in some general sense (Maynard Smith 1982; Gintis 2000).”
Proactive Resource Management for LTE in Unlicensed Spectrum: A Deep Learning Perspective (2017, methodology): “averse based fairness model, into the strategy design of the agents [20].”
Dynamic spectrum access in open spectrum wireless networks (2006, background): “• A distributed version of the channel access protocol based on an anthropological model that uses only local information is proposed.”