‘Theory of Mind’ and Tracking Speakers’ Intentions

By F. Happé, E. Loth. 2002

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The Interface of Language and Theory of Mind. (2007, background): “One study bears this out: children studied by Happé and Loth (2001) in a naming study could use information about others' false beliefs in learning a new word before they could pass traditional false belief tasks (unfortunately, these were also verbal).”
Turning Believers into Skeptics: 3-Year-Olds' Sensitivity to Cues to Speaker Credibility (2007, background): “Indeed, Happe and Loth (2002) found that the same preschoolers who failed the classic location false belief task ( Wimmer & Perner, 1983 ) succeeded when the task was re-framed in terms of a mistaken belief about the name of an object in a box.”
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? (2009, background): “For instance, Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello (2002; see also Happé & Loth, 2002) provided evidence that children take into account false beliefs in learning new words; there is also a range of evidence on deceptionrelated behaviors (Newton, Reddy, & Bull, 2000; Polak & Harris, 1999; Reddy & Morris,…”
Relevance theory: A tutorial (2002, background): “A Cautious Optimist, with enough metarepresentational capacity to pass first-order false belief tasks, might be capable of dealing with mismatches of this type, but unable to deal with deliberate deception (Sperber 1994; Bezuidenhout & Sroda 1998; Wilson 2000; Happé & Loth 2002).”