Symbiosis of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union

By Avinash Dixit, Luisa Lambertini. 2003

238 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b19dfb936cce0a8e57b71f502c470ec8112ce95d

Citations in the corpus

• Stock market response to monetary and fiscal policy shocks: Multi-country evidence (2013, unknown): “It is further argued (see, Demertzis et al., 1999; Dixit and Lambertini, 2000) that an agreement on the final intentions between the two policies is very important because if the central bank formulates disinflationary policies while the government is engaged in expansionary strategies then final ou”
• The Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of the EMU and Other Monetary Unions: An Overview of Recent Research (2010, unknown): “If they do (see Dixit and Lambertini 2003), i.e., ˜ and ˜ y i M = ˜ y i F > 0, ∀ i , there are ( n + 1) objectives ( n output levels and one inflation level) and an equal number of policy instruments.”
• Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies (2003, unknown): “The central bank is more conservative than society in the sense that θM ≤ θF and/or πM ≤ πF , yM ≤ yF .”