Corporate Finance and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism

By Patrick Bolton, Xavier Freixas. 2006

281 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b11a48a1e81f5c28d704f585b98a4f6772cc4527

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Citations in the corpus

Capital Regulation, Risk-Taking and Monetary Policy: A Missing Link in the Transmission Mechanism? (2008, unknown): “Bolton and Freixas (2006) Static, GE Basel I Yes No No A contractionary monetary policy constrains bank lending by reducing the net interest margin and thus reducing banks’ incentive to issue new equity to finance new loans.”
Financial Accounting in the Banking Industry: A Review of the Empirical Literature (2014, unknown): “4 Although the Berger et al. (2008) evidence is inconsistent with Admati et al.”
Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis (2013, unknown): “Using detailed credit register information for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers default, we are able to study how relationship and transaction-banks responded to the crisis and we test existing theories of relationship banking.”
Thoughts on Financial Accounting and the Banking Industry (2014, unknown): “The existence of financing frictions driven by asymmetric information between bank managers and market participants underpin theories of monetary policy transmission through a bank lending channel (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000) and capital crunch theories positing that regulatory capital concerns c”
Housing Price Booms and Crowding-Out Effects in Bank Lending (2018, background): “6 See also Thakor (1996) and Bolton and Freixas (2006) for models of banks’ financial constraints.”
Liquidity Provision, Bank Capital, and the Macroeconomy (2016, background): “Bolton and Freixas (2006) argue this by showing that “good” banks may refuse to raise capital in order to avoid Myers and Majluf (1984) “lemons” costs of equity issuance.”
Bank Profitability and Taxation (2010, unknown): “However, in a deterministic world like this one, there would be no reason to hold excess capital (Bolton and Freixas, 2001).”
Corporate Governance: What’s Special About Banks? (2013, background): “Moreover, Bolton & Freixas (2000, 2006) argue that asymmetric information about banks’ net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital and that such asymmetric information is particularly severe in a crisis, constraining the ability of banks to lend.”