Physically Observable Cryptography (Extended Abstract)
By Silvio Micali, Leonid Reyzin. Theory of Cryptography Conference, 2004
420 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, Hardware and Architecture
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/009583f0ac5518f5854fadea7f71a67b1d2fcb89
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Emmanuel Prouff
- Shafi Goldwasser
- Daniel Wichs
- Vinod Vaikuntanathan
- Matthieu Rivain
- Joël Alwen
- Stefan Dziembowski
- Krzysztof Pietrzak
In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
- Stefan Dziembowski
- Krzysztof Pietrzak
- Emmanuel Prouff
- Matthieu Rivain
- Shafi Goldwasser
- David A. Basin
- Vinod Vaikuntanathan
- Daniel Wichs
In Hardware and Architecture
Citations in the corpus
- Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Cryptography in the Bounded-Retrieval Model (2009, result): “Another line of work, initiated by Micali and Reyzin [23] and studied further by Dziembowski and Pietrzak [13,27], designs various symmetric-key primitives under the axiom that “only computation leaks information”.”
- Masking against Side-Channel Attacks: A Formal Security Proof (2013, methodology): “Our model can be seen as a specialization of the physically observable cryptography framework [29] with leakage functions belonging to the class of noisy functions as defined above (the similarities between our model and this framework are discussed in the full version).”
- Leakage-Resilient Cryptography (2008, background): “5 Finally let us mention that some constructions of ciphers secure against general leakages were also proposed in the literature, however, their security proofs rely on very strong assumptions like the ideal-cipher model [28], or one-way permutations which do not leak any information at all [25].”
- Simultaneous Hardcore Bits and Cryptography against Memory Attacks (2009, background): “In this paper, we consider an entirely different family of side-channel attacks that are not included in the computational side-channel attack family, as they violate the basic premise (or axiom, as they refer to it) of Micali-Reyzin [ 33 ] that only computation leaks information.”
- An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks (2007, background): “Micali et al. [ 25 ] propose physically observable cryptography, a mathematical model that aims at providing provably secure cryptography on hardware that is only partially shielded.”