The Econometrics of Corporate Governance Studies

By Mak Yuen Teen. 2003

137 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b048471ecbbfb9a3c17793cbd65306ed4a28ac52

Citations in the corpus

• Which Governance Mechanisms Promote Efficiency in Reaching Poor Clients? Evidence from Rated Microfinance Institutions (2012, unknown): “Several aspects of board composition are usually considered in the literature, and the impact of both independent directors and separated CEO/Board Chair roles seems most important (Bhagat and Jefferie, 2002).”
• Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital (2010, unknown): “Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) suggest that it is difficult to adequately control for the simultaneity between valuations and organizational structures.”
• Governance and Performance Revisited (2004, unknown): “Our simultaneous equation approach, which has the potential of capturing both mechanism endogeneity and reverse causation, has been used earlier in a governance–performance setting (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2002; Bhagat and Jefferis, 200”
• The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation (2010, unknown): “3 See, among others, Bhagat and Jefferis (2005), Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006), Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007), Bhagat, Bolton, and Romano (2008), and Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu (2009).”
• One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence (2007, unknown): “…discuss the managerial ownership literature; Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) discuss corporate boards; Burkart and Panunzi (2006) discuss takeovers; Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) discuss antitakeover measures, and Hu and Black (2006) discuss the role of institutions and derivative markets in…”