Regulation and Distrust

By Philippe Aghion, Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc, A. Shleifer. 2010

905 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it. In the model, distrust creates public demand for regulation, while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want more government intervention even though the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on social capital and beliefs about government’s role, as well as on changes in beliefs and in trust during the transition from socialism.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b0389a96bba31baae26952e18715610ee8f6e333

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

  1. Christian Bjørnskov
  2. Yann Algan
  3. Pierre Cahuc
  4. Pierre-Guillaume Méon
  5. A. Alesina
  6. Nathan Nunn
  7. Paola Giuliano
  8. Xiangang Xin

In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Christian Bjørnskov
  2. Yann Algan
  3. Claudia Senik
  4. Andreas Bergh
  5. Pierre Cahuc
  6. Luigi Zingales
  7. Nathan Nunn
  8. Paola Giuliano

In Sociology and Political Science

  1. Christian Bjørnskov
  2. Yann Algan
  3. Pierre Cahuc
  4. Pierre-Guillaume Méon
  5. Nathan Nunn
  6. Paola Giuliano
  7. Andreas Bergh
  8. A. Alesina

Citations in the corpus