Accruals Management, Investor Sophistication, and Equity Valuation: Evidence from 10–Q Filings
By S. Balsam, Eli Bartov, Carol A. Marquardt. 2002
305 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/afb588969d93498159e0366986d5339317777f19
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Siddharta Utama
- Aziatul Waznah Ghazali
- K. Subramanayam
- Frank Heflin
- Nur Aima Shafie
- D. Deis
- Santanu Mitra
- Mahmud Hossain
In Finance
- Siddharta Utama
- K. Subramanayam
- Frank Heflin
- D. Deis
- Santanu Mitra
- Mahmud Hossain
- Rebecca N. Hann
- S. Siregar
In Strategy and Management
- Siddharta Utama
- Aziatul Waznah Ghazali
- K. Subramanayam
- Frank Heflin
- Nur Aima Shafie
- D. Deis
- Santanu Mitra
- Mahmud Hossain
Citations in the corpus
- Do Individual Investors Cause Post-Earnings Announcement Drift? Direct Evidence from Personal Trades (2008, unknown): “1 Several studies suggest that institutional investors are more sophisticated traders than are individual investors (Hand 1990; Lee et al. 1991; Walther 1997; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000; Balsam et al. 2002; Bonner et al. 2003; Asthana et al. 2004; De Franco et al. 2006; Mikhail et al. 2007), and s”
- Jeopardy, Non-Public Information, and Insider Trading Around SEC 10-K and 10-Q Filings (2005, unknown): “…is a long line of research documenting stock price reactions to the unexpected component of these announcements—beginning with Ball and Brown (1968), who study price movements around earnings announcements; and including Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt (2002), who study price movements around 10-”
- Fair-Value Pension Accounting (2007, background): “For example, unsophisticated investors may be unable to recast financial statements according to footnote disclosures, which may lead them to erroneous decisions and put them at a disadvantage versus sophisticated investors (see, e.g., Balsam et al., 2002; Bartov et al., 2000).”
- Type of earnings management and the effect of ownership structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices: Evidence from Indonesia (2008, background): “Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt (2002) present evidence that is consistent with the opportunistic perspective.”
- Investor Sophistication and the Mispricing of Accruals (2003, unknown): “Using a sample of firms for which there is ex-post evidence of earnings management, Balsam et al. (2002) investigate whether investors reassess the integrity of recently announced quarterly earnings using information provided in quarterly financial statements (SEC 10-Q filings) as they become availa”
- The Role of Newswires in Screening and Disseminating Value-Relevant Information in Periodic SEC Reports (2011, unknown): “…hours 12 Based on our discussions with SEC’s Office of Information Technology, we understand that the periodic report time stamp is a good indication of when the filing could be accessed by users, but at least in the earlier years not everyone had instantaneous access to EDGAR (Balsam et al. 2002).”
- Earnings Management: An Analysis of Opportunistic Behaviour, Monitoring Mechanism and Financial Distress (2015, background): “Similarly, a study from Balsam, Bartov, & Marquardt (2002) and Siregar & Utama (2008) claimed that lenders have more access to relevant and timely information that enable them to detect earnings management done by unethical managers.”
- Institutional Stock Ownership, Accrual Management, and Information Environment (2005, background): “In addition, Balsam et al. (2002) find evidence that, relative to individual investors, institutional investors are more capable of quickly recognizing and decomposing the accrual components into discretionary and nondiscretionary parts to reassess the reported earnings integrity because of their ac”