Institutional Stock Ownership, Accrual Management, and Information Environment

By Santanu Mitra, William M. Cready. 2005

142 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/864e0822ee825a0f57fb52dc9787abac59852fc5

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate Governance, Islamic Governance and Earnings Management in Oman: A New Empirical Insights from a Behavioural Theoretical Framework (2017, unknown): “…( i ) the link between CG structures (e.g., board characteristics) and EM (Chung et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Davidson et al., 2005; Mitra & Cready, 2005; Lin et al., 2006; Rahman & Ali, 2006; Jaggi & Tsui, 2007; Jiraporn & Gleason, 2007; Bowen et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2008;…”
• Stock price crash risk: review of the empirical literature (2018, unknown): “Extant studies suggest that monitoring by the institutional owners constrains a manager's ability to manage abnormal accruals opportunistically and, hence, improves earnings quality (e.g., Mitra and Cready, 2005; Velurya and Jenkins, 2006).”
• Drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of global institutional investors: Evidence from earnings management (2016, unknown): “The corporate governance literature has long argued that institutional investors play a prominent monitoring role because they have the economic incentive and knowledge sophistication to be effective monitors (Gillan, 2006).”