Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules
By Charles Wyplosz. National Institute Economic Review, 2005
393 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ad4da248b2f8fc3879bb6ed91ed9af45b8b67992
How researchers see this paper
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In Economics and Econometrics
- X. Debrun
- Manmohan S. Kumar
- Jeffrey A. Frankel
- Catherine A. Pattillo
- Michael Bergman
- Government Efficienc.
- Hougaard Jensen
- Andrew Hodge
In Finance
- Jeffrey A. Frankel
- X. Debrun
- Manmohan S. Kumar
- Catherine A. Pattillo
- Charles Wyplosz
- Michael M. Hutchison
- M. Goldstein
- Ilan Noy
Citations in the corpus
- Promoting sustainable public finances in the European Union: The role of fiscal rules and government efficiency (2016, background): “(2008), for example, identifies four broad categories of solutions to the deficit bias problem: (1) fiscal policy-makers may be held more accountable for their actions (Corbacho and Schwartz, 2007); (2) improved budgetary procedures that govern the preparation, approval and implementation of annual ”
- Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Councils and All that: Commitment Devices, Signaling Tools or Smokescreens? (2007, background): “However, the literature is far from unanimous in this, with some influential observers arguing that rules-based fiscal frameworks per se need not deliver: rather under quite plausible and realistic assumptions, they are likely to end up meeting the same fate as monetary rules because their effective”
- Second-Generation Fiscal Rules; Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability (2018, background): “First, the delegation of selected fiscal instruments to independent agencies mandated to preserve debt sustainability (see, for example, Wyplosz 2005 or Basso and Costain 2016 for a recent proposal) raises considerable legitimacy issues due to the inherently redistributive nature of fiscal policy…”
- Targeting the Structural Balance (2007, neutral): “Some authors have even advocated the delegation of fiscal policy to independent Fiscal Councils (Wyplosz, 2005), for reasons akin to the delegation of monetary policy to independent Central Banks.”
- European Monetary Union: the dark sides of a major success (2006, methodology): “Various applications of this idea have been mooted, from fully independent fiscal policy committees (Eichengreen et al., 1999; Calmfors, 2003; Wyplosz, 2005a), to advisory expert councils (Sapir et al., 2004) and to independent accounting and forecasting agencies ( Jonung and Larch, 2004).”