Real time detection of cache-based side-channel attacks using hardware performance counters

By Marco Chiappetta, Erkay Savas, Cemal Yilmaz. 2016

268 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

1. Daniel Gruss
2. Michael Schwarz
3. Moritz Lipp
4. Stefan Mangard
5. Clémentine Maurice
6. Yuval Yarom
7. Jo Van Bulck
8. Daniel Genkin

In Computer Networks and Communications

1. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
2. Wei Yang
3. Nikita Borisov
4. Kari Kostiainen
5. Michael Schwarz
6. Alexandra Dmitrienko
7. Frank Piessens
8. Stefan Mangard

In Signal Processing

1. Daniel Gruss
2. Michael Schwarz
3. Moritz Lipp
4. Yuval Yarom
5. Stefan Mangard
6. Clémentine Maurice
7. Daniel Genkin
8. Samuel Weiser

Citations in the corpus

• Property Inference Attacks on Fully Connected Neural Networks using Permutation Invariant Representations (2018, background): “HPCs have been demonstrated to be useful in detecting malware [11, 47], cachebased side-channel attacks [10] and cryptomining behavior [41] in clouds and enterprises.”
• Mining on Someone Else's Dime: Mitigating Covert Mining Operations in Clouds and Enterprises (2017, methodology): “In addition to generic malware, HPCs have also been successfully used to detect kernel-level rootkits [53], side-channel attacks [34], firmware modifications [54] etc.”
• Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX (2020, background): “In particular, the documentation of the according SENTER instruction mentions that [36, 6-21]:”
• A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware (2016, unknown): “Both Gruss et al. [65] and Chiappetta et al. [39] suggested using the performance monitoring unit (PMU) to detect LLC side-channel attacks.”
• Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack (2015, methodology): “However, application-level countermeasures are bounded and cannot prevent cache attacks such as covert channels and Rowhammer.”
• Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses (2017, background): “The underlying Flush+Reload loop of Rowhammer is also detected by cache attack defenses [17, 75].”
• Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical (2017, background): “Previous works [42, 11] suggested to use system-level monitoring of performance counters to detect cache performance anomalies as a signature of on-going cache-based attacks.”
• Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks (2017, background): “Subsequently, several other approaches instrumenting performance counters to detect cache attacks have been proposed [9,19,40].”