Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment

By Stephen M. Bainbridge. 2005

227 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Minority Shareholders’ Control Rights and the Quality of Corporate Decisions in Weak Investor Protection Countries: A Natural Experiment from China (2013, background): “Opponents such as Bainbridge (2006) counter that minority shareholders’ direct participation in corporate decisions will reduce shareholder value for several reasons.”
Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting (2012, unknown): “Union pension funds are also extremely active through the media (Schwab and Thomas 1998) and have been successful in influencing regulatory reform (Davis and Kim 2007; Bainbridge 2006).”
Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited (2013, unknown): “On the other, opponents of this model contend that " director primacy " is preferable (Bainbridge, 2006; Blair and Stout, 1999), as shareholder dominance would produce its own, significant set of agency costs (Bratton and Wachter, 2010).”
Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective (2010, unknown): “Bainbridge (2006) goes as far as claiming that proposal submissions should be restricted by 7 authority of the board of directors.”