Institutional reform, economic changes, and local environmental management in China: the case of Guangdong province

By Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Shui‐Yan Tang. 2006

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Performance Management, High-Powered Incentives, and Environmental Policies in China (2015, background): “Under this system, sub-national leading officials are responsible for the environmental performance of their jurisdictions and are evaluated by the nomenklatura system (Lo and Tang 2006, 202).”
New sustainable business models in China (2009, background): “The impact of the introduction of new administrative arrangements for environmental management is gradually fi ltering through and encouraging the more economically developed jurisdictions and enterprises to invest in environmental projects with higher social returns (Lo and Tang, 2006).”
Perverse Incentive Structure and Policy Implementation Gap in China's Local Environmental Politics (2013, background): “…biggest obstacle to environmental policy implementation for two reasons: (a) they are development-oriented at a cost to the environment and (b) the central government has decentralized too much power to control local governments, while maintaining very weak control (Economy, 2004; Lo & Tang, 2006).”