Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice

By Wolfgang Pesendorfer, A. Wolinsky. 2000

134 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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When Do Experts Cheat and Whom Do They Target (2005, background): “Other important studies of expert markets which are also related to my paper include those by Biglaiser (1993), Taylor (1995), and Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003).”
The economics of credence goods : an experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition (2011, background): “…for example, on whether a competitive sampling of opinions makes it attractive for experts to provide costly but unobservable diagnostic effort ( Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Asher Wolinsky 2003 , or under which conditions sellers have an incentive to lie about the true diagnosis in order to…”
Conflicts of interest, information provision, and competition in the financial services industry (2007, background): “Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) consider situations in which uninformed customers may seek second opinions.”
On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods (2006, unknown): “For instance, Emons (2001) attributes the main difference between his own work and the papers by Pitchik and Schotter (1987 and 1993) and Wolinsky (1993) to the fact that “they all (implicitly) assume unnecessary repairs to be costless whereas our expert needs resources for unnecessary treatments.”