Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry

By Donald P. Morgan. 2002

1,156 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a9b0c61ef4bd02500ac9e4eaf32c9ad83bcc4e67

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate governance and performance of financial institutions (2015, background): “…they may employ obscure and sophisticated financial instruments and engage in risky lending activities without appropriate risk assessment, resulting in greater information asymmetries and a more unstable financial system (Morgan, 2002; Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, 2008).”
Stress Testing Banks (2014, background): “Moreover, bank balance sheets are notoriously opaque and subject to easy-to-hide asset substitution (higher risk for lower risk assets); Morgan 2002.”
Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test (2001, background): “Credit card lending became a very risky business over the sample period here, with a sharp rise in writeoffs from late 1994 to 1998 or beyond (Morgan and Toll, 1997 and Black and Morgan, 1999).”
Corporate Governance and Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks (2011, background): “be extremely complex and opaque which results in information asymmetries that intensify agency problems (Morgan, 2002).”
Governance and Bank Valuation (2004, background): “Many argue that banks are extraordinarily complex and opaque (Morgan, 2002).”
What matters in disclosures of key audit matters: Evidence from Europe (2018, neutral): “Morgan (2002) shows that banks receive more different bond ratings from different rating agencies than do nonbanks.”
Earnings management behaviors under different monitoring mechanisms: The case of Islamic and conventional banks (2016, background): “, 2011), and greater information asymmetries between insiders (managers) and outsiders (stakeholders) (Morgan, 2002).”
Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services: Issues and Options (2006, neutral): “11 Caprio and Levine (2002), Morgan (2002).”
Financial statement comparability and credit risk (2013, neutral): “…rated by at least two of the top three (the top two) rating agencies, percentages consistent with prior literature (Akins 2012; Cheng 2012; Livingston et al. 2007; Morgan 2002; Cantor and Packer 1997). rating_range denotes the absolute value of differences in ratings (in notches) between agencies.”
Committee Independence and Financial Institution Performance During the 2007–08 Credit Crunch: Evidence from a Multi‐Country Study (2011, background): “For example, Pathan, Skully, and Wickramanayake (2008) find that improved financial institution governance is related to stock returns during a financial crisis.”
Corporate Governance in Banking: The Role of the Board of Directors (2008, background): “Information asymmetries can be found in all sectors, yet the problems arising for financial intermediaries may be aggravated by the complexity of the bank business (Furfine, 2001; Levine, 2004; Morgan, 2002).”