Predicting risk sensitivity in humans and lower animals: risk as variance or coefficient of variation.

By Elke U. Weber, Sharoni Shafir, Ann-Renée Blais. Psychology Review, 2004

617 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a886fa5b93b73193c71c594a6831ce22a13ec21f

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Citations in the corpus

Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making (2006, background): “In particular, in situations of deficit (loss), deprivation, starvation, or when one has ‘‘nothing to lose,’’ risk taking may offer the only means of improving one’s situation, as research on foraging in animals indicates (Weber et al., 2004).”
Learning, risk attitude and hot stoves in restless bandit problems (2009, background): “Previous studies on decisions from experience (e.g. Denrell (2007), Erev and Barron (2005), Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev (2004), March (1996) and Weber, Shafir, and Blais (2004)) have focused on simplified static environments.”
Angry men and disgusted women: An evolutionary approach to the influence of emotions on risk taking (2004, result): “Although findings regarding the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991) suggest that it might be possible to simulate losses from baseline by allowing participants to possess and handle a sure payoff sum prior to decision making, consistent with the house money effect (Thaler & Johnson,”
Neuronal Reward and Decision Signals: From Theories to Data. (2015, background): “However, the coefficient of variation, CV " SD/EV, is often a better measure for risk in economic choices (633).”
Stories vs. facts: triggering emotion and action-taking on climate change (2019, background): “” Stories can become proxies for the vivid personal experience (Cron 2012) shown to be an effective way of learning (Hertwig et al. 2004; Weber et al. 2004).”
Modeling the interplay between affect and deliberation. (2015, background): “For example, Weber et al. (2004) found that some differences between human and animal behavior in the domain of risk disappear when differences in reward learning are controlled for.”
Public understanding of climate change in the United States. (2011, neutral): “Such learning processes give recent events more weight than distant events, which is adaptive in dynamic environments where circumstances change with the seasons or other cycles or trends (Weber et al., 2004).”
Communication and Mental Processes: Experiential and Analytic Processing of Uncertain Climate Information (2007, background): “This suggests that the way in which information is communicated and the processes that this communication triggers are important determinants in the outcome of decisions that involve small probability events (Hertwig et al., 2004, 2006; Weber et al., 2004).”
A common role of insula in feelings, empathy and uncertainty. (2009, positive): “As decisions between equally expected rewards are biased by the degree of uncertainty, uncertainty itself possesses motivational value [ 32 ] and can be reflected in a feeling state.”
The Impact of Revenue Diversification on Expected Revenue and Volatility for Nonprofit Organizations (2014, background): “For a comparison of the variance and coefficient of variation in predicting risk sensitivity, see Weber, Shafir, and Blais (2004).”
The Description-Experience Gap in Risky Choice: The Role of Sample Size and Experienced Probabilities (2008, methodology): “Experience matters. As Barron and Erev (2003), Gottlieb et al. (2007), Hertwig et al. (2004), Newell and Rakow (2007), and Weber et al. (2004) observed, decisions from experience and decisions from description can differ widely.”
What shapes perceptions of climate change? New research since 2010 (2016, background): “Judgments and decisions based on infrequent events from experience tend to underestimate the true probability and show strong recency effects, thus making them more volatile than judgments and decisions from statistical description.(65) Empirical evidence for this pattern of response comes from an a”
Biased samples not mode of presentation: Re-examining the apparent underweighting of rare events in experience-based choice (2008, background): “This has led to calls for separate descriptive theories for the two types of decision (Hertwig et al., 2004; Weber et al., 2004), because existing theories of risky choice such as prospect theory seemingly fail to capture some of the key features of experience-based decisions (Barron & Erev, 2003).”