Propping through related party transactions

By Ming Jian, T. Wong. 2010

799 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a7a889505afcb87f00440e82d494a89c200e20fb

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Citations in the corpus

Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience☆ (2010, background): “As we show later, the decline coincides with a concerted campaign by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 15 In fact, both Jian and Wong (2010) and Liu and Lu (2007) find that the pattern of earnings management observed among Chinese firms is consistent with an abiding desire to facilitate…”
Effects of Audit Quality on Earnings Management and Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from China (2011, positive): “Jian and Wong (2010) argue that even SOE managers have strong incentives to help listed firms maintain their listing status and qualify for raising more funds, because such firms are better able to help improve employment levels and enhance infrastructure development of the regions in which they ope”
A Reexamination of Tunneling and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods (2012, neutral): “7 Jian and Wong (2010) used a methodology partially based on Bertrand et al. (2002) to examine industry shocks and tunneling in Chinese state-owned firms during the years 1998-2002, but their study did not include firm fixed effects and their sample consisted solely of state-owned firms.”
Do school ties between auditors and client executives influence audit outcomes (2016, neutral): “4 the firms to themselves typically via connected party transactions (Berkman et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2010; Jian and Wong, 2010).”
Related-party transactions and corporate governance: The evidence from the Taiwan stock market (2012, background): “Bertrand et al. (2002) and Jian and Wong (2010) document that when there are incentives to meet earnings targets, related sales are used to dampen the effects of negative industry shocks on listed firms' earnings.”
Controlling shareholders' tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China (2011, methodology): “Jiang et al. (2010) provide compelling evidence that inter-corporate lending is used by controlling shareholders as a tool to tunnel from listed companies.”
The real effect of partial privatization on corporate innovation: Evidence from China's split share structure reform (2020, background): “They could even directly exploit minority shareholders through various tunneling activities (Jiang et al., 2010; Jian and Wong, 2010).”
In the name of charity: Political connections and strategic corporate social responsibility in a transition economy (2015, background): “Prior studies show that government subsidies are a means through which politically affiliated firms are bailed out by the government (Jian and Wong, 2010; Faccio, 2006).”
Value relevance, earnings management and corporate governance in China (2015, background): “…evidence that concludes that related-party transactions arewidely used to manipulate earnings for financial reporting (Aharony et al., 2010b; Jian and Wong, 2010; Lo et al., 2010a; Wong et al., 2015), and good corporate governance mechanisms could moderate the level of tunneling in China…”
The Sensitivity of Corporate Cash Holdings to Corporate Governance (2012, background): “…protection a¤orded Chinese minority investors makes it possible for controlling shareholders to control the listed company s cash and, if needed, to divert the cash to their own uses by related-party transactions and similar arrangements (see, e.g., Jian and Wong 2010; Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010).”