The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits

By Melissa L. Finucane, A. Alhakami, Paul Slovic, Stephen M. R. Johnson. 2000

2,067 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, General Decision Sciences, Sociology and Political Science, Cognitive Science & Psychology, Economics & Operations Research

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

In General Decision Sciences

In Sociology and Political Science

In Cognitive Science & Psychology

In Economics & Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Anticipating Safety Issues in E2E Conversational AI: Framework and Tooling (2021, neutral): “They tend to lump multiple independent dimensions together as a single intuitive, highly-correlated, wholesale judgment (Slovic, 1987; Finucane et al., 2000a; Slovic & Peters, 2006; Slovic et al., 2013).”
Dependence of flood risk perceptions on socioeconomic and objective risk factors (2009, positive): “Individuals may have a higher risk perception if flood risk is associated with negative feelings, which may have been caused or reinforced by experiences with flooding or evacuation due to a flooding threat [Finucane et al., 2000; Keller et al., 2006].”
The role of emotions in judging the moral acceptability of risks (2006, positive): “According to Slovic et al. (2002) and Finucane et al. (2000), people use an ‘aVect heuristic’, which means that for laypeople, certain risks are aVectively loaded, which inXuences the way in which they rate risks: If people use the aVect heuristic, then a person who has a positive feeling about,…”
Emotion and action (2002, neutral): “This view of the relationship between emotion and decision-making has been challenged by Antonio Damasio (1994) and other researchers (Finucane et al., 2000; Isen, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, in press; Schwarz, 2000).”
Heuristics made easy: an effort-reduction framework. (2008, positive): “Instead, affect in general is serving as an easy-to-access cue, and the heuristic principle is choosing to use easy-to-access cues (Finucane et al., 2000; Frederick, 2002; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Monin, 2003; Monin & Oppeneheimer, 2005; Slovic et al., 2002).”
Divergence between individual perceptions and objective indicators of tail risks: Evidence from floodplain residents in New York City (2015, neutral): “Michel-Kerjan: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, Suite 500, Huntsman Hall, 3730 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA (e-mail: erwannmk@wharton.upenn.edu).”
Overcoming Algorithm Aversion: People Will Use Imperfect Algorithms If They Can (Even Slightly) Modify Them (2018, neutral): “Participants who have had the ability to adjust the model’s forecasts may actually hold the model in higher regard, perhaps because their increased satisfaction with the forecasting process bleeds into their feelings about the model (e.g., Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000).”
The Halo Effect in Business Risk Audits: Can Strategic Risk Assessment Bias Auditor Judgment about Accounting Details? (2005, positive): “For example, Finucane et al. (2000) found that the overall impression people formed about the holistic attributes of decision alternatives created a halo that biased their evaluative judgments related to detailed analytic information about the level of risk associated with each alternative.”
How to define and measure risk perceptions (2019, positive): “This way of evaluating is fast, automatized, requires few cognitive recourses, improves judgmental efficacy, and increases under time pressure (Damasio, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2007).”