Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?

By G. Schwert. 2000

940 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a6cde1fc8a0cc01cce31056b4c029e1b8f98d872

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Citations in the corpus

Are Fairness Opinions Fair? The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions (2008, positive): “…only hypothesis described in 13 Consistent with previous studies, friendly mergers are significantly more likely to be completed compared to hostile takeovers, while the presence of a competing bid makes it much more difficult to complete the deal (e.g., Schwert, 2000; Betton and Eckbo, 2000).”
Corporate governance and the information environment: Evidence from state antitakeover laws ☆ (2012, background): “However, using an extended sample period, Schwert (2000) finds that takeover activity declined after the passage of these laws.”
Do Shareholders of Acquiring Firms Gain from Acquisitions? (2003, neutral): “5 Schwert (2000) finds a positive coefficient on bidder size when examining cumulative abnormal returns from day 63 before the announcement to day 126 after the announcement.”
Let's make a deal! How shareholder control impacts merger payoffs (2005, background): “Schwert (2000) finds little economic difference between friendly and hostile transactions.”
The Market for Corporate Control and the Cost of Debt (2009, background): “For example, Schwert (2000) show that hostile bids never represented more than 30 percent of all deals.”
The effects of mergers on company employment in the USA and Europe (2004, neutral): “Since we lack data for wages and the user cost of capital on a comparable international basis for around 50% of the merger sample, we presented the main results excluding them 24 Schwert (2000) considers unnegotiated tender offers as a measure of the hostility of US deals.”
Value creation from M&As: New evidence (2017, neutral): “…firms (Bradley et al., 1988); vii) a control for takeover hostility ( HOSTILE ) since it tends to be negatively associated with acquirer returns (Schwert, 2000); viii) a diversification dummy variable ( DIVERS ) equal to one when the acquirer and target have different 2-digit SIC codes to…”