Let's make a deal! How shareholder control impacts merger payoffs

By T. Moeller. 2005

200 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/82e3d36e5be59a4461fc07b53a922dd6ab8adf6c

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Citations in the corpus

CEO Preferences and Acquisitions (2014, unknown): “Walkling and Long (1984), Morck et al. (1988), and Cotter and Zenner (1994) find that managers with smaller equity stakes put up more resistance to takeover bids. Finally, both Wulf (2004) and Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2010) examine the retention of target CEOs by the merged firm an”
Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation for Corporate Social Responsibility (2015, unknown): “For our first measure, we calculate the percentage of shares outstanding owned by executives at a firm (e.g., Davila and Venkatachalam, 2004; Moeller, 2005; Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008 ).”
Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors (2010, unknown): “In Section 4, we investigate performance changes, managerial turnover, acquisition decisions, CEO compensation, takeover performance], Byrd and Hickman (1992), Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997), Harford (2003), and Moeller (2005) [Mergers and acquisitions].”
Bargaining power and industry dependence in mergers (2012, background): “For instance, it has been shown that larger managerial ownership increases premiums (Stulz, 1988; Stulz, Walkling, and Song, 1990; Song and Walkling, 1993; Moeller, 2005) and that managers trade premiums for private benefits (Wulf, 2004; Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, 2004).”
Executive Personality, Capability Cues, and Risk Taking (2011, background): “The size of an acquisition premium reflects the acquiring CEO’s assessment of how much more valuable the target company will be in his or her hands, or confidence that he or she can manage the target’s assets better than the incumbent managers (Roll, 1986; Moeller, 2005).”
Serial Acquirer Bidding: An Empirical Test of the Learning Hypothesis (2011, background): “Some evidence indicates that a target CEO’s entrenchment and 7 power reduce takeover premiums (Hartzell et al., 2004; Moeller, 2005).2 To the best of our knowledge though, the dynamics of acquirer bidding and the impact of learning on premiums in the course of corporate serial acquisitions remain…”
The role of investment banker directors in M&A (2014, background): “…that relates corporate governance to a firm's acquisition decision, with particular attention to the impact of board independence and board size on acquisition performance (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner, 1997; Harford, 2003; Moeller, 2005; and Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007).”