Evolutionary games and spatial chaos

By Martin A. Nowak, R. May. 1992

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Citations in the corpus

Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas (2017, background): “Our main result is that both of the SSDs we considered, Gathering and Wolfpack, have empirical payoﬀ matrices that are Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD).”
Games on graphs (2014, methodology): “An approach to spatial evolutionary game theory was formulated by Nowak and May [63], [64], who studied the Prisoners’ Dilemma and other games on lattices.”
Network analysis in conservation biogeography: challenges and opportunities (2010, background): “…where each actor is located within a single cell in a regularly spaced grid) have suggested that sustainable cooperation is more likely when interactions occur only with immediate neighbours rather than with any other individual in the community (Nowak & May, 1992; Nowak et al., 1994; Nowak, 2006).”
A robust rational route to randomness in a simple asset pricing model (2005, unknown): “To illustrate the importance of the role of synchronous/asynchronous updating of beliefs, let us recall a classic discussion of the results of Nowak and May (1992).”
The evolution of cooperation and altruism – a general framework and a classification of models (2006, background): “Thus, in the simulations of Nowak & May (1992), altruists are more likely to be surrounded by altruists than defectors at the beginning of the simulation, with the effect that altruists generally do better than defectors.”
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (2003, background): “Pollack (1989); Nowak and May (1992); Nowak, Bonhoeffer, and May (1994); Grim (1995); Hegselmann (1996); Epstein (1998).”
The evolution of altruism by costly punishment in lattice-structured populations: score-dependent viability versus score-dependent fertility (2005, background): “…on the evolution of cooperation in the lattice model assumed that fertility depends on the game’s score, but that mortality is independent of the score (Nowak and May, 1992; Wilson et al., 1992; Mitteldorf and Wilson, 2000; Brandt et al., 2003; Le Galliard et al., 2003; Hauert and Doebeli, 2004).”