Key infection: smart trust for smart dust

By Ross J. Anderson, Haowen Chan, Adrian Perrig. Proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols, 2004. ICNP 2004., 2004

309 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Electrical and Electronic Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a46fc766428d767ad07b10e0168ad9a5d45a8551

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In Artificial Intelligence

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Citations in the corpus

A survey of key management schemes in wireless sensor networks (2007, methodology): “In the Random Subset Scheme, random polynomials are selected from a polynomial pool and assigned to each node in a network to avoid the Basic Scheme's vulnerability in possibly using a key in more than one node.”
Random key predistribution schemes for sensor networks (2003, background): “The basic idea behind multipath key reinforcement was first explored by Anderson and Perrig [2].”
MiniSec: A Secure Sensor Network Communication Architecture (2007, methodology): “There are numerous candidate solutions, such as Random Key Predistribution [3– 5, 9, 12], Key Infection [2], and LEAP [16].”
Key management systems for sensor networks in the context of the Internet of Things (2011, background): “All the protocols that generate their keys through mutual agreement belong to the negotiation framework , and they usually work under the assumption that there is little or no threat against the integrity of a WSN network in the very early stage of its lifetime [39].”
LEAP: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks (2003, background): “Anderson et al.[ Anderson et al. 2004 ] described an interesting scheme that can be used by sensor nodes to establish pairwise keys in environments with a partially present, passive adversary.”
Sensor network security: a survey (2009, background): “Similar to scheme in [55], Miller and Vaidya in [56] propose a predistribution scheme that allows neighboring sensors to establish secure link keys from plaintext keys that are broad-”
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks (2007, background): “In particular, we would like to express our gratitude to Tansu Alpcan, David Basin, Jean Bolot, Daniel Figueiredo, Virgil Gligor, Matthias Grossglauser, Markus Jakobsson, Phil Janson, Frank Kargl, Edward Knightly, P. R. Kumar, Jean-Yves Le Boudec, Li Erran Li, Peter Marbach, James Massey, Cristina N”
Securing wireless sensor networks: a survey (2008, background): “A weaker attack model [58] assumes that an attacker can only eavesdrop on a small number of communications between sensor nodes during the node deployment phase.”