Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance

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Moral hazard and sickness insurance (2005, background): “The pattern of higher labor supply elasticities for income security programmes than income taxes did also emerged in a recent overview by Krueger & Meyer (2002) .”
Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2008, unknown): “For instance, Krueger and Meyer (2002, 2328) remark that behavioral responses to UI and other social insurance programs are large because they “lead to short-run variation in wages with mostly a substitution effect.””
Labor Market Effects of Unemployment Insurance Design (2014, unknown): “1 Previous overview studies are at least a decade old; see Atkinson and Micklewright (1991), Holmlund (1998), Karni (1999) and Krueger and Meyer (2002).”
The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain (2008, unknown): “Krueger and Meyer (2002) describe the state-administered UI programs of the U.S.”
Separations, Sorting and Cyclical Unemployment (2017, unknown): “In the U.S., the maximum unemployment benefit is binding for approximately 35% of the unemployed workers (see Krueger and Meyer, 2002).”