Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament

By S. Hix. 2004

332 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Vote-earning strategies in flexible list systems: Seats at the price of unity (2013, background): “It has been shown that in order to build a personal, as opposed to partisan, an MP has an incentive to vote against his or her party’s line when the MP’s supporters disagree with party leaders (Hix, 2004; Carey, 2007).”
Empowerment of the European Parliament (2013, background): “F or p er so na l u se o nl y. the instructions from their European political groups (Hix 2004).”
The Primary Effect: Preference Votes and Political Promotions (2016, background): “As noted by Hirano and Snyder (2013), in the U.S. context primary elections are mostly needed when competition between political parties is poor.”
The Rejected, the Ejected, and the Dejected: Explaining Government Rebels in the 2001-2005 British House of Commons (2007, background): “A party leadership is more able to enforce loyalty in party-centered electoral systems than in candidate-centered systems (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Hix, 2004; Mitchell, 2000; Samuels, 1999).”