Vote-earning strategies in flexible list systems: Seats at the price of unity
By Brian F. Crisp, Santiago Olivella, Michael Malecki, M. Sher. 2013
123 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/29dffd326e5921e0fd31f3bd85d5504ae578232a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Olle Folke
- Johanna Rickne
- Torsten Persson
- Guido Tabellini
- W. Henisz
- Daron Acemoglu
- Timothy J. Besley
- Philip E. Keefer
In Political Science and International Relations
In Safety Research
Citations in the corpus
- The Primary Effect: Preference Votes and Political Promotions (2016, background): “If parties use preference votes to guide top appointments, this will likely increase candidate vote-seeking behavior, such as deviations from the party line or bill initiation (see Bräuninger, Brunner, and Däubler 2012, and Crisp et al. 2013).”
- Local Favoritism in At-Large Proportional Representation Systems (2016, unknown): “Due to its (Crisp et al., 2013).”