Consciousness and mind

By David Rosenthal. 2005

643 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a4596ea175f6cee6d56d17457942a199fa319f28

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In Philosophy

Citations in the corpus

Insects have the capacity for subjective experience (2016, background): “We think it is possible to have subjective experience without higher-order thoughts (Edelman, 2003; Rosenthal, 2005), self-awareness of oneself as a subject (Christoff, Cosmelli, Legrand, & Thompson, 2011; Morin, 2006), or reportable access to one’s own phenomenal states (Block, 1995).”
Implicit and explicit knowledge in second language acquisition—CORRIGENDUM (2012, background): “For example, a structural representation such as An R can be repeated several times is only conscious if it is explicitly represented, that is, if there is a higher order thought such as I know/think/believe that an R can repeated several times (Rosenthal, 2005).”
How can we measure awareness? An overview of current methods (2015, background): “The above issue begs the question: what do we measure and what do we want to measure? In the Sandberg et al. (2010) experiment, PAS was shown to be more exhaustive than CR or PDW, in that PAS showed a correlation between accuracy and awareness at very brief stimulus durations, whereas CR and PDW sho”
Attribution theories: How people make sense of behavior. (2011, background): “, “The plants are dry”), not their own mental state of believing (“I believe: the plants are dry”; Moore, 1993; Rosenthal, 2005).”
Imperative content and the painfulness of pain (2011, background): “Representationalism, under some guise or other, is one of the most popular approaches to a naturalistic treatment of phenomenal consciousness (to name but a few recent discussions, cf. Carruthers 2000; Dretske 2003; Van Gulick 2004; Rosenthal 2005; Tye 2000).”
The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology (2011, background): “And this isn’t a difference that should always be accessible to introspection, on anyone’s view of the latter.”
The social brain? (2007, background): “For example, second-order representations may have something in common with the higher-order thoughts that may be necessary for conscious experience (Rosenthal 2005).”
Time to Give Up the Dogmas of Attribution (2011, background): “, the plants are dry); they do not normally represent their own belief quamental state (they do not represent I believe the plants are dry) (Rosenthal, 2005).”
Actor-observer asymmetries in explanations of behavior: new answers to an old question. (2007, background): “They do not normally represent their own belief qua mental state; that is, they do not represent I believe the plants are dry (Moore, 1993; Rosenthal, 2005).”
Metacognition: computation, biology and function (2012, background): “Rosenthal has previously proposed an inﬂuential higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness in which mental states are conscious in virtue of a metarepresentational state—an HOT—about them [39].”
Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World (2007, background): “Another quite different view of consciousness is provided by David Rosenthal (Rosenthal, 2005) who argues that consciousness consists of being the target of “higher order thoughts” (HOTs) or of having noninferential (unmediated and typically unconscious) thoughts about one’s thoughts.”