Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
By Glenn Shafer, Daniel Kahnerman, Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky. 1984
Subfields: Game & Decision Theory, Cognitive Science & Psychology
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Game & Decision Theory
- Dean A. Shepherd
- Cars H. Hommes
- K. Stanovich
- Richard J. Zeckhauser
- David E. Heckerman
- Richard E. Petty
- W. Kip Viscusi
- Max H. Bazerman
In Cognitive Science & Psychology
- Paul Slovic
- Josh Tenenbaum
- W. Botzen
- Jeroen C. J. H. Aerts
- Jean‐Louis van Gelder
- Max H. Bazerman
- Ellen Peters
- Tobias Gerstenberg
Citations in the corpus
- European Union Regulations on Algorithmic Decision-Making and a "Right to Explanation" (2016, background): “, [30, 10, 1]), and discriminatory decision making is pervasive in many of the sectors where algorithmic profiling might be introduced (e.”
- Supersparse linear integer models for optimized medical scoring systems (2015, background): “These qualities help users gauge the influence of each input variable with respect to the others, which is especially important because humans can only handle a few cognitive entities at once (7± 2 according to Miller 1984), and are seriously limited in estimating the association between three or mo”
- Methods and Models for Interpretable Linear Classification (2014, background): “Expository Power : Humans are seriously limited in estimating the association between three or more variables [52].”
- Occam's razor is insufficient to infer the preferences of irrational agents (2017, neutral): “However, it is well-known that humans deviate from rationality in systematic , non-random ways [Tversky and Kahneman, 1975].”
- Differential Privacy: An Economic Method for Choosing Epsilon (2014, neutral): “These are both active areas of research—for instance, research in psychology has identified a number of cognitive biases when people reason about uncertain events [15].”
- Qualitative Verbal Explanations in Bayesian Belief Networks (1996, background): “Even though probability theory satisfactorily models most types of uncertain reasoning, it seems to be, as a large body of empirical evidence indicates, remote from the cognitive representation of uncertainty [12].”
- Beyond Constraining and Enabling: Toward New Microfoundations for Institutional Theory (2017, unknown): “Moreover, studies of intuition in cognitive psychology (Chase & Simon, 1973; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) and management (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Simon, 1987), although less explicitly focused on the social origin of schemes, may nonetheless provide important insights on…”
- Dependence of flood risk perceptions on socioeconomic and objective risk factors (2009, background): “Heuristics are simple rules that individuals may use in risk judgments [Kahneman et al., 1982].”