The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment

By Rafael Lalive, J. van Ours, Josef Zweimüller. Social Science Research Network, 2002

342 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labor market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter is the duration of unemployment of the non-sanctioned. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9e645dbf10a47d9b990c92ac43cc9bb01c040ba1

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Markus Frölich
2. Jochen Kluve
3. M. Lechner
4. J. van Ours
5. Rafael Lalive
6. Patrick Arni
7. M. Rosholm
8. S. Behncke

Citations in the corpus

• Unemployed and their caseworkers: should they be friends or foes? (2010, positive): “Thus far, the effects of single instruments on employment have been considered separately: positive effects were found for sanctions (Van den Berg et al., 2004; Lalive et al., 2005; Abbring et al., 2005) and for the assignment of onerous labour market programmes via threat effects (Black et al.”
• Counseling the Unemployed: Does it Lower Unemployment Duration and Recurrence? (2005, neutral): “1”
• Estimating the Threat Effect of Active Labour Market Programmes (2004, background): “Moreover, Black et al. (2003) find similar evidence for the U.S., while Lalive et al. (2002) find compelling evidence of a threat effect of search requirements and sanctions.”
• The Effect of Integration Policies on the Time Until Regular Employment of Newly Arrived Immigrants: Evidence from Denmark (2009, background): “(2005), Lalive et al. (2005, 2008), and Rosholm and Svarer (2008). We model the duration from date of residence permit to regular employment simultaneously with the duration from time of”
• Immigration to the Land of Redistribution (2010, neutral): “1999; Engelen et al. 1999) and in Switzerland ( Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimuller 2000 ).”